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Calo: Awesome. Okay. Open up my notes here. Maybe move this 
guy a little bit. Thanks. Just enough to get those open. Okay. Can 
everybody hear me pretty well? Not bad? Okay. 
Well, thank you so much. I’m really, really honored to be here. I’ll 
be just across the city at Seattle University. This is a place that has such 
wonderful students and just a world class faculty from whom I learn so 
much all the time. I just spent, for example, a bit with your Charlotte 
Garden who does, um, she and I went to the Amazon Go grocery store and 
talked through some of the labor and, and consumer issues there which is 
a lot of fun, but we have frequent interactions and they’re always deeply 
enriching. 
You know, in particular, I’ve just learned a tremendous amount from 
my dialogue with, you know, with David and, and Ron around robot 
speech so much so that it’s an area that I’ve just sort of tentatively started 
to think about myself, but it was really inspired by their wonderful book 
and I, and I, I know that you’re done plugging it, but I’m going to plug it. 
I think it’s a fabulous book. Robotica. And just a great foundation along 
with Helen Norton and other’s works in this area. 
Thank you particularly to the Law Review. I was symposium editor 
myself and I know a lot of work goes into this and, you know, I go to a lot 
of these things. The, the quality of the dialogue from that first panel was 
just exemplary and I hope that that’s emblematic of the day and I trust it 
will be. 
So, okay, so as the substance though. So, this, this symposium is 
provocatively entitled Singularity: AI and the Law. And for those of you 
who are not aware, I, I doubt anybody in this room is bothering to spend 
all day talking about robot laws is not aware, the singularity is like this 
moment where the capacity of machines equals or rivals those of humans. 
1124 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:1123 
And on some stories of the singularity we merge together in ways that are 
sort of complicated, right? And, you know, there is a sense in which 
machines already rival the cognitive capabilities of people, right? You 
know, take for example a calculator. I mean, for a long time, you know, 
they can do calculations faster than we can. You know, take certain other 
kinds of tasks like chess or Go. I mean, in those narrow domains already 
computers vastly exceed our cognitive capability. You know, they’re there 
and they have been doing this for, for quite some time. And so, the 
question for the singularity is less about whether in particular domains in 
particular ways there might be advances, but almost in, in every way or 
that they would actually somehow be intentional and conscious the way 
that we are. That they’d be able to do all the cognitive tasks that people 
can do and maybe even come, come to exceed them. 
So, in those contexts emulating, in other contexts emulating human 
performance seems like a distant dream, okay? One example I want to give 
you is Daniela Hernandez, who is now at the Wall Street Journal, she 
recently trained an AI to write erotica. Okay? So, she had like a, she trained 
it on a bunch of erotica and she just was like just in the same way that you 
might teach a system to play chess or teach a system to play Go, she did 
this. I’m not going to read it to you but, and I’m not myself a connoisseur, 
but it is terrible. It’s terrible. It’s very, very bad, all right? You know, there, 
there are certain things that these, that these systems just are not even close 
to being able to do and won’t be for a very long time, all right? 
Now, but let’s imagine just for a moment that the singularity was 
plausible in our, in our lifetimes, right? And that you actually had these 
systems that were like people and maybe even exceeded the capabilities 
of people. I’ve got to tell you that would, that would break quite a bit of 
the law, okay? It would break quite a bit of the law which, of course, 
assumes a biological basis for people and animals at a minimum. So, let 
me just give you a, a simple example first. Imagine it’s 2050 and there’s 
this AI and the AI says, you know, “I’m, I’m like just like you except I’m 
smarter and I’m more moral and I can, can gather all this information and 
I don’t, I don’t get any information glut or overload. You know, I’m just, 
I’m just awesome and I, I really would like to, to run for, for Congress 
because I think I can improve substantially on, on whoever.” Not, not 
Suzan DelBene, our wonderful congresswoman. She, she could not be 
replaced or improved upon, but let’s say in some particular district. Or 
let’s say that this AI decides I really want to run for President, right? Do 
we make the AI wait 35 years? You see? There’s a fundamental, a set of 
assumptions, right? So, I’ll give you another example. A more complex 
one. Say an AI wakes up one day in Howard’s lab or Howard and Blake’s 
lab and just says, you know, “I, I am, I am just like you, right? I, and I’m 
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just an…,” and no one can disprove it. No one is able to disprove. No one 
is able to question it. And they say, “Look, and, you know, not only am I 
just like you, like a person like you, but I’ve read your constitution and 
I’ve read your case law and, you know, I think I should have the ability to, 
to procreate because that’s a fundamental right. You know what I mean?” 
And people say, “Well, that seems reasonable. Yeah, I mean, of course, 
you know, you’re like a person. I guess you should be able to procreate. 
We can’t stop you from procreating.” “And the way that I procreate is that 
I combine with another algorithm or I generate another version of myself 
and that takes on certain characteristics. That’s how I, that’s how I 
procreate. Oh, and by the way, I’ve also been reading your constitution 
and reading your interpretation of your constitution and I’d like another 
thing too. I would like suffrage. I’d like to be able to vote just like every 
other, you know, adult can in your society. Every other member of your 
society with consciousness.” Which of those two fundamental rights do 
you confer upon this artificial intelligence? Do you give it the right to copy 
itself or do you give it the right to vote? You see why you could not do 
both, right? It would, it would really compromise our fundamental 
democratic system to have somebody that vote could vote early and vote 
often, right? 
So, so, there’s these sorts of questions that are, that are, if we get to 
a point of a true singularity there are some really tough questions that we 
have to reexamine in light of, in light of the assumptions that the law has 
about our fundamental biology. So, these questions feel far off and indeed 
I think that they are and I want to spend the bulk of my time with you today 
talking about robot law past and present. It may seem strange for me to 
say robot law past because we think of robots as being, you know, they’re 
like perennially the thing of the future, right? I mean, as soon as something 
starts to like work and look normal it’s no longer a robot. I think, Blake, I 
think you’ve said that before. It’s like a, it’s like a washing machine if it 
works, right, and… But the point of the matter is, is that robots are always 
that future technology that’s somehow far off on the horizon, but it turns 
out that the law has already confronted a number of super interesting robot 
law cases, okay? 
For example, there was the time that a court had to decide whether a 
robot version of Vanna White violated the publicity rights of the real 
Vanna White, right? In Samsung v. Vanna, I mean, no, people know 
Samsung v. White. This is a case where Samsung created this ad that had, 
you know, a future, a robot doing, you know, Wheel of Fortune with like 
a blond wig and so forth and real Vanna White got very upset and she sued 
and a court had to figure out whether a robot replica of somebody was that 
person for right of publicity. And it was, it turned out be quite an important 
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and quite an interesting case and, and the court did allow Ms. White to, to 
proceed. 
There was a time that a court had to decide… Okay, so, some of you 
I know are from a different generation than me one way or the other, but 
does anybody in this room remember Chuck E. Cheese? Do you guys 
know Chuck E. Cheese? Okay, everybody does. Okay, good. I’m always 
making like references and my students look at me like what are you 
talking about Professor Calo. So, I’m glad that that one does not go over 
people’s heads. A court had to decide whether to charge Chuck E. Cheese 
a performance tax on food because of those animatronic robot bands that 
they have. You know those things, right? So, people would go in there and 
there’d be like this robot band with like, you know, the mouse and like the 
guy with the pizza and they would just turn on and just play a whole thing 
and all the kids would like shut up for a moment and delight about it. And 
some enterprising tax authority in Maryland was like, “that’s a 
performance and there’s a performance tax on food.” You’re going to have 
to pay that now. And they had to fight about it and it was a fascinating case 
because ultimately what the court decided was that a performance had to 
be spontaneous and that this was just a, this was just basically a glorified 
jukebox. And, you know, what’s interesting about that in, in Maryland in 
the 1990s is that may have been true about the state of robotics then, but it 
feels not true about the state of robotics now. Now there’s a lot more 
emergent behavior. A lot more spontaneity in these systems. 
I could go on and in fact I will go on. There was a time when a court 
had to decide… So, when people, when, when you import things from 
other countries there’s a tariff schedule that tells you how much to, how 
much to charge people. Right? There was a time when we first started to 
import toy robots from Japan where there was a significant question on 
how to tariff them because there was a historic difference between what 
you charged people for dolls, toys that were dolls, versus other kinds of 
toys. There was, for historic reasons there was a, a, I believe a lesser tariff 
on, on dolls than other kinds of toys like a car and the way that the tariff 
schedule read, read was that, that, that a doll represents something animate. 
So, people started to import these, these robots from Japan and the tax 
authority tried to charge them as though they were, you know, some other 
kind of object and the importer said, “No, no, no, no. These are, these 
represent something animate.” And a court had to figure out whether a 
robot represents something animate or not and they had all these 
conversations about what it is to be animate and, and what a robot is and 
all this different stuff. And this is the 1950s, okay? What did the court 
find? The court actually found that while robots do represent something 
animate because they’re mechanical men is what the court said. They’re 
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mechanical people. A toy robot only represents a robot and a robot is 
mechanical so they’re going to get charged at the mechanical tariff instead. 
This came up so often that now there’s actually a robot provision in 
our tariff law to deal with this exact problem. It came up again a few years 
later because somebody imported a robot. Do you guys remember this? 
This is not something that like I would have, as old as I am I wouldn’t have 
played with this toy as a kid, but this, this is a toy that was like one of those 
old robots that actually had an astronaut face. Okay, so it was like one of 
those boxy toy robots, you know, or whatever it was, but it had a, it had 
this, this astronaut face behind it and they had to go through the whole 
thing again because they were like, well, this is not a robot now. It’s 
actually an astronaut. You know what I mean? So, it’s not a robot. It’s a 
robot astronaut, but that means it represents something animate because, 
you know, astronauts are animate and then the court, once again, had to 
confront the question and the court said things like, “Well, it’s still, it’s 
still not, you know, animate because most astronauts don’t have machine 
guns that come out of their chests,” which is what one feature of this 
particular thing is. 
Anyway, it came up so often that they had to change the tariff 
schedule to avoid this problem. Okay. 
There was another one where, where the court had to decide whether 
or not, for purposes of maritime law, whether or not a robot submarine that 
was just teleoperated could possess a shipwreck for purposes of the law of 
salvage in order to exclude other potential salvors. And in that case 
involving a famous shipwreck involving Spanish gold in Central America 
the court decided a new doctrine called telepossession that actually laid 
out the foundations for possessing something only with a robot and that 
precedent wound up being very, very important because it’s precisely what 
the court applied in the Titanic discovery, right? Because lots of people 
found the Titanic at the same time and the question was who had the first 
right of salvage. 
Last one is one that my research assistant Madeline found last year 
and it’s kind of amazing which is that there was this fight between these 
two, this, this robot parts manufacturer got into a fight with a consultant 
that was helping, I’m sorry, this, this car parts manufacturer got into a fight 
with a consultant that was helping to optimize its, its parts manufacturing 
for Ford and the whole fight about, between the consultant and the, and 
the car parts manufacturer who wound up blowing a bunch of deadlines 
with Ford was over the quality of the robots that were supplied. Okay? So, 
one party tried to get testimony about how the robots were bad robots 
because they almost tore a guy’s head off excluded from testimony 
because then the jury would think that all robots are bad or that these robots 
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were bad. And, and another thing they wanted to get excluded was the fact 
that these robots were obviously, they were obviously tired and that’s why. 
I mean, all these anthropomorphic things and they, the sense, so much was 
at issue, you know. Anyway. And I talked to, I talked to Radiolab, NPR 
Radiolab about this for like an hour, but then they never did the show 
which really makes me… 
Anyway, so, these are, these are real cases from the past and there 
are more and I was amazed to find them frankly and these are cases, not 
the cases that just happened to involve a robot because lots of cases happen 
to involve a robot. These are cases where it really mattered it was a robot. 
It really mattered that that was part of the, the issue and that’s what the 
court had to grapple with and I expect more, but I think the immediate 
future is even more interesting and I think we’re getting a preview of that 
with this first panel and with the panel that you’re stuck with me again for. 
And let me give you a couple examples of that. 
We talked about intentionality. You know, Bruce Johnson brought 
up the notion of intention, of intent and how important it is to certain first 
amendment context. Intentionality is of critical importance to, of course, 
criminal law, right? We expect there to be mens rea. We expect it to be 
either intending or substantially certain. You know, there are, there’s a 
recent Supreme Court case saying that we frown upon even negligence as 
a standard in, in criminal law and yet you have these systems that are 
displaying emergent behavior that nobody really intended. And not to pick 
on Microsoft, which I love. They also fund my lab so thank you Microsoft 
for funding my lab, but Microsoft Tay is a very good example. This, this 
chatbot that they put online that began, that was subverted essentially by 
trolls and began to say terrible things. Deny the Holocaust, you know, call 
people horrible racist names and so on until of course Microsoft took it 
offline. Now, Microsoft would not be subject to liability in the United 
States due to first amendment protections. You know, if Microsoft for 
some reason wanted to be totally racist they would be allowed to be in our 
society. They don’t want to be of course, but what about in Germany where 
denying the Holocaust is illegal? Right? What do we think about that and, 
of course, what they would say is, “Well, we didn’t intend it. We didn’t 
intend it.” 
Another example comes from tort law. As you know in this room I 
think a lot of you guys have taken tort and if you haven’t then you’ve heard 
me lecture about it in the past, but in tort law we expect things to be 
foreseeable even in strict liability. The kind of harm that happens with a 
particular accident needs to be at least foreseeable to, to the parties behind 
it. And there are all kinds of things that worry about not being foreseeable. 
An example that we used, um, I was part of an effort that I believe that, 
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that two of our panelists also were a part of as well, but just sort of 
educating Congress about what robotics needs, this is a roadmap to 
robotics that, that some of us did and, and, and the example we used in that 
in the legal section was imagine a driverless car that was a hybrid, you 
know, gas/electric, and it was told to maximize its efficiency by 
experimentation, okay? But wary of giving too much authority to this 
autonomous vehicle, they said but you have to obey traffic, you know, 
signals and stuff. You can’t just like, you know, race around. You can’t… 
You know what I mean? You can’t suddenly stop. I mean, you have to do 
things within the law and you have to protect your passengers and you 
have to protect pedestrians. You know, basically giving it a set of 
parameters like you’d expect. Okay? But what this system figures out is 
that it has a better day from a fuel efficiency perspective if it starts the day 
off with a full battery. So, at night it decides to run the gas engine killing 
everybody in the house by poisoning them and you go to the engineers and 
you say, “Your, your robot killed someone!” You, you know, and they’ll, 
they’re going to say, well, I think very credibly they’re going to say, “We 
had no idea it would do that. We didn’t even think of that as a category.” 
Right? Okay. Now, maybe that matters, maybe that doesn’t, but at the end 
of the day what you, what the prospect I think is in the near term whether 
it’s about speech or it’s about physical safety is are we going to have 
victims without perpetrators? How long is the law going to tolerate that? 
Right? So, these core commitments of criminal law, of, of tort I think that, 
that, I think that we’re going to see it be challenged. 
I have a couple more examples that I won’t get into because it did so 
beautifully in the, in the earlier remarks, but again, if robots have free 
speech rights what are the contours of those rights and are they the same 
contours as those, as those of people? 
When, if ever, should artificial intelligence be in a position to 
exercise force or make any kinds of decisions that relate to human life? 
One of the applications that people are putting forward today for artificial 
intelligence is end of life decisions. You know, is that something that even 
if they were awesome at it we would want them do? Right? 
Okay, so, my thesis then, you know, you’re supposed to put your 
thesis up, up front and I’m hiding the ball a little bit, but my, my thesis is 
probably pretty obvious which is that well short of the singularity which 
could break everything, could break a lot, there are phenomenally 
interesting questions for lawyers and what I would say is at this point in 
the trajectory of, of this space it’s actually time to start coming up with 
answers. You know? I mean, because I’ve been part of this dialogue for 
like ten years and it was sufficient to ask questions for a long time. You 
know, what happens if…? Wouldn’t it be interesting if, you know? And I 
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think that’s important and that’s what we as academics should be doing in 
part, but I also think it’s time to pivot and start to answer some of these 
questions because it, it really matters to, to people’s lives. So, you know, 
we, people like Elon Musk like to warn about the dangers of a robot 
apocalypse. In other words, you know, Elon Musk has said things like, you 
know, you’re not going to be believe that there’s a, there’s going to be a 
robot apocalypse until robots are, are actually dragging people out of their 
homes and shooting them. This is the kind of thing that he says. It’s like a 
board of governors, okay? There’s a lot of problems with that statement. 
One of which is what is it we’re supposed to do about that? You know 
what I mean? Like what it is that, what is the way, how do we address that 
as a society the prospect that in a hundred, 300 years, if ever, that robots 
will go door to door? There’s also a deep irony there, right? It’s very ironic 
to hear from a person that, that we should be worried about robots in the 
future killing people when Elon Musk’s company built a robot that last 
year killed someone, right? I mean, you know, he, it was a person named 
Joshua Brown. A human being who died because autopilot could not 
distinguish a, a white van against the white sky. Right? These systems are 
getting deployed today. They’re getting deployed in, in, in our vehicles 
and in other systems, but they’re also getting deployed in ways that, that 
actually, you know, manage, manage human affairs in terms of deciding 
who, who goes to jail and for how long and the like. And so, I think it is 
sort of high time for us to have some, some, some actual solutions be put 
forward. 
That said, I think we’re actually super well positioned to do that in 
many ways. In part because of dialogues like the ones that we’re having 
today and in part just because all quarters of our, of our society are starting 
to realize that this is important, right? We have, you know, I can’t tell you 
how many times I’ve spoken to legislators at a state and federal level, to 
judges. I’ve spent time at the Pentagon. I’ve spent time with three-letter 
agencies. I’ve spent, you know, everybody wants to talk about this stuff 
and they’re really interested in it. Even in the, in the last decade, you know, 
I have students who now they do robot law for a living like that’s what 
they do. They’re like, they’re like corporate council for, for Prime Air for 
example, you know, for Amazon’s drone program or they’re, or, you 
know, or they work on driverless car stuff. Littler Mendelson, which is 
like the largest employment firm in the, in the world, has a whole robotics 
practice group because there’s so much attention being paid by the private 
sector to concerns around automating and what it will do for jobs. 
And so, you know, in many ways I feel like we are super well, well 
positioned. I think we are in many ways better positioned than we were 
with respect to the internet. You know, I think the internet was something 
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that there wasn’t a lot of interdisciplinary conversation going on in the 
early days of the internet. It took a long time for it to be professionalized 
to the point where you felt like you had internet lawyers, you know. I mean 
it just, it just took some time for society to do catching up and I think we’ve 
learned a lot since that period of time and that our institutions are actually, 
you know, getting in early enough in sort of the growth of this technology 
and with the right tools that I’m very hopeful we actually will have these 
solutions to help manage this society. 
Okay, so, I wanted to, to make sure to leave some time for, for Q&A 
and, and for our next panel, but with that I’d love to turn it over to all of 
your questions. Anybody have any questions for…? Yes, please? 
Speaker 2: I was reading through your comment on the temporal 
differences between technology and our ability to respond in the law. 
Obviously, this has been going on for a long time from DNA to computer 
science to robots. 
Calo: Yeah. 
Speaker 2: What do you think about that as we think about 
solutions? 
Calo: So, I often hear it said that technology outpaces the law and 
that there’s some inherent problem there because law is not fast enough 
and technology is really fast. That has not been my experience. That’s not 
been my experience. In the sense that while it may take time, you know, 
like anything else, law is built to be flexible and it has weathered many a 
change. You know, if you think about a, about a doctrinal backwater like 
negligence hanging out for, for, for years and years in maritime and so on 
and then suddenly coming to, to inform practically all of tort law with the 
invention of the, of the train and the necessity of mediating how 
dangerous, but also how wonderful and helpful trains were. You see that 
there’s a lot of flexibility here, right? And, you know, if you, if you look 
at, at how fast some of these changes have been, you know, there will be 
like a decade time between which everybody is using horses in New York 
City to which there are almost no horses in New York City. You know 
what I mean? So much so that like the, the people that make oats and stuff 
like that that have been selling to horses need to, all of a sudden pivot and 
start to pretend that we need it in our breakfast cereal and that’s where 
cereal advertising comes from because they had all these oats that they 
were not being used with horses and they’re like, “Who are we going to 
feed these to? I know. Kids.” Right? So, like these huge sea changes and 
yet, and yet we somehow, the common law somehow caught up. You 
know what I mean? It’s not like we sit there and worry about the, the, you 
know… 
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Anyway, there’s that. Right? There’s also, of course, the, the favorite 
of law professors, the quintessential difference between rules and 
standards, right? So, you might have a rule that’s outdated. You might 
have a rule that seems to apply really well to the model of Congress in 
1986 around email protection, but you also have a standard. And so, if you 
look at the Federal Trade Commission thinking about robots, right? Unfair 
and deceptive practice is just as relevant today as it was a hundred years 
ago or so when that standard got first announced. 
And so, I don’t worry about it. I don’t worry about it. I think there’s 
going to be growing pains and I, and I don’t mean to minimize that. It’s 
often the vulnerable who lose out during these periods of transition and we 
need to be very cognizant of that and to, and to try to shelter that as much, 
change as much as possible against the vulnerable. It’s often that the 
benefits and harms of technologies are not evenly distributed across 
society and we have to be mindful of that. So, I don’t mean to be… But I 
do really believe that the law is capable of absorbing these changes too. 
Yeah, I have David first. Yep. 
Speaker 3: Ron, I’m not sure—quite right the common law has 
adapted to changes in society in general, general is the better I guess genre, 
and we will be incrementally to absorb the inventions into existing law, 
but it’s, it’s, Marshall McLuhan said that we move into the future by 
looking in the rearview mirror and, of course, he was criticizing that. 
That’s what the common law does. I mean, we, and, and so, your, your 
example of the car was wonderful because for the longest period of time 
we called it the, you know, the horseless carriage. That, that’s the rearview 
mirror. We, we only could associate the car with the invention that 
increased further technology that preceded it. I think the, that the problem 
with robotics is if, if the futures are right then the movement from the 
robotics of today to the robotics of tomorrow may be a dramatic thing, and 
if that occurs I wonder if the common law can catch up and that sends… 
I, I would ask, I mean, do you really, does your argument depend on a slow 
evolution of robotic development or does your argument comprehend as 
well the possibility of moving, of a dramatic shift? A tectonic shift in 
robotics which, which approach of saving the cognitive singularity? 
Calo: Yeah. So, I, I don’t, I don’t want to minimize what I think is 
going to be the degree of change. It could be, it could be a wildly different 
world that we all live in because of robotics and artificial intelligence. I’m 
sort of professionally betting on that, right? And, and I don’t, so, so it could 
be quite a, quite a sea change as it were. And, you know, it’s true that 
there’s an essential conservatism. Maybe a Burkean conservatism. Maybe 
a not Burkean conservatism about, about the common law and it’s, in that 
its, in that its ways that it weights, uses previous analogy and, and, and 
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precedent looks backwards. You know, one of the real funny interesting 
paradoxes that I find in artificial intelligence is that the, is that the, the 
proponents of artificial intelligence will often say the following two things 
which feel like they’re at tension. One of which is artificial intelligence is 
going to change everything. It’s going to change everything. It’s going to 
change the way we do everything. We’re going to do everything 
differently. Healthcare, everything is going to be so different, but nothing 
should change. Nothing should change at all, right? It’s almost because 
it’s going to change everything that we need to be completely hands off 
and make sure nothing changes and that does not make any sense, right? 
There’s never been a transformative, truly trans-, it’s either all hype about 
AI or we’re going to have to change our law and our legal institutions, 
right? 
So, I don’t mean to say that we’re not going to have to make those 
changes. I think we are, but I would just say that, you know, in some 
instances changes have changed not the common law itself, but rather how 
we govern in general or how our institutions look. The vaccine is a good 
example of this, right? So, smallpox vaccine started off wi-, there was 
really no modern administrative state at the time of the smallpox outbreak 
and when the vaccine… And the idea that you could actually vaccinate 
people against smallpox and save, you know, maybe all of, all of our 
societies, you know, but you could save people’s lives that way. This was 
something that had to be manufactured and disseminated by a trust, a 
trusting source. And so, the, the need to disseminate the vaccine is part of 
the story of how we came to have a modern administrative state and now 
I tell, you know, students who want to go into tech law or anything else, I 
think I was just talking to one of them just today, about how you should 
take administrative law because administrative law is super, super 
important. Before this change I used to, I used to point to how, you know, 
it’s not like, it’s not like the Ninth Circuit or the, or the local courts that 
are on the back of your phone. It’s the FCC symbol that’s on the back of 
your phone. I mean, agencies touch everything and that wasn’t always the 
case. But, but isn’t that a beautiful example of law and legal institutions 
keeping their core commitments but, but, you know, evolving to, to tackle 
change? So, that’s all, that’s really what I’m trying to say. I don’t know if 
there’s, if that’s responsive David or not. 
And then there was a question over here. 
Speaker 4: Yeah. I’m kind of going at a, going at a different angle. 
Just in terms of the extent that we’re, we were trying to regulate these 
technologies like data, machine learning, and AI and one of the issues is 
to really regulate it effectively you’ve got to understand it and, but, most 
of the knowledge, the access to the data and knowledge about the 
1134 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 41:1123 
algorithms are, are in the control of pretty much the big tech companies at 
least and they have the money to hire the experts. So, how do you regulate 
effectively if you’re playing catch up? 
Calo: I think the first step towards having the kind of wise and 
inclusive policy we want on artificial intelligence and robotics is 
systematic accrual of, accrual of expertise by the government and I have 
written about that. I have a piece for the Brookings Institution called The 
Case for a Federal Robotics Commission. The entire point of which is to 
argue that governments need their own independent expertise at all, at all 
levels in order to know how to think about what industry says to them, 
right? Our Senator Maria Cantwell has a bill that I’ve been heavily 
involved in that would create a federal advisory committee located within, 
within the Department of Commerce that would help the government 
understand robots and artificial intelligence. Senator Schatz out of Hawaii 
has actually gone so far as to propose the federal robotics commission that 
I mentioned or he will be in legislation. Whether that will get me traction, 
I have no idea. We can’t even re-fund office of technology assessment 
which is like on the books already and helps congress with technology, but 
has been defunded and no, and you know, there’s like two people in the 
Office of Science and Technology Policy in the current administration. So, 
we have a long way to go, right? But that would ideally be what, what we 
would, what we would do and I think it’s critical. I think it’s critical both 
because you’re going to make bad choices about governance of technology 
without that expertise, but also, you know, a big role that government has 
is, is procurement, you know. I mean, who is going to be able to test the 
viability of massive driverless car use in the United States better than the 
postal service which has deep needs of being more efficient and also by 
the way is shielded from negligence liability for what would, what would 
happen. You know what I mean? So, they’re kind of an interesting way. 
And but, if, if they go and they’re the ones who are going to be buying a 
lot of driverless cars from your Fords or, or your Googles or whoever then 
they being very knowledgeable they can ask for the right kinds of 
questions and assurances and that will drive the market. Same with all 
these devices that like, I mean, all these systems that purport to tell you 
whether someone is a recidivist risk that the courts are buying without 
understanding the technology. 
My, my solution would be don’t buy things that you don’t 
understand. You know, look to Elizabeth Joh’s work for example in 
figuring out what you should be figuring out before you buy a system like 
that, right? I mean, so there’s these resources available for savvy 
governments and there are these levers they can use in addition to 
regulation, but absolutely the first step is, is, is getting that and it’s really 
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hard to compete with industry. I think that giving how many electrical 
engineers and computer sciences and so forth we’re producing at UW and 
that you’re producing here at Seattle University, I think that the, that the 
days of, of sort of sports athlete like competition over machine learning 
talent are, are limited, right? But at the moment who can compete with 
Facebook or Google over, over talent? I mean, it’s, you know, it’s hard. 
It’s hard. And so, let alone the government. And so, yeah, yeah. 
Speaker 4: I had a follow up to that. 
Calo: Yep, follow up, sure. And then we have one more. 
Speaker 4: In terms of regulation, again, in dealing with things like 
machine learning, you know, algorithms that are going, what are the 
changes to go and then they, then the fact that it’s hard, as you mentioned, 
to predict what they’re going to do. How do you, any time you regulate 
that? How do you control it, you know, in terms of understanding? I mean, 
you can understand it to a certain like you mentioned government not 
buying, not that they don’t understand, but, you know, even experts don’t 
fully understand how some of these things work, but they’re coming into 
the marketplace. 
Calo: Yeah, I mean, so, okay. So, there, there’s a sort of a long-
winded answer to this, but I’ll give you a, a shortened version for the sake 
of our, of our time and to get to the, the next question which is that what 
you need to understand may vary from context to context, right? And there 
may be certain instances where a particular technology should not be 
deployed at all because it’s not, it’s not in a position to be understood. You 
see what I mean? So, you know, we might ask a sensible question around, 
you know, are there, are there systems that are so obscure to us and so 
indecipherable that we shouldn’t be using them to make decisions about 
whom to kill in the theater of war or how long people should be in jail, 
right? But the kinds of systems that have been used in the past, like make 
risk scores for people, those are not black box systems. Those are systems 
that people can understand quite well. They’re basically linear regression 
actually, but, but they’re hiding behind proprietary software, you know, 
software trade secret law essentially and the, and the, and the courts that 
purchased them did not think, even though they’re courts of law, did not 
think to say, “Well, in the event that a litigant challenges one of these we 
need to be able to get at the system so the defense can be bound to.” That 
was not a condition of buying the software which is bizarre. And so, we’re 
not talking about some deep neural net that no one understands. We’re 
talking about linear regression that they’re pretending is, you know, a trade 
secret. 
So, the, the fruit is much… Another thing too, another theme that I 
like to… I’m going to adopt, David, your tenants idea that tenant three 
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is… The, the fruit is hanging much lower than you think, you know what 
I mean? Like there’s a lot of things we could be doing here that are just 
right down there at a toddler level. 
Yeah, your question please? 
Speaker 5: You tangentially addressed when you were talking about 
proprietary software, but one of the things that I, I’ve heard about should 
complicate this issue is the particular concept litigation if you’re maybe 
just talking in the context of consumer products especially talking about 
artificial intelligence. You know, not, not autonomous, but it’s 
programmed to adapt to the user, to adapt to the consumer. So, there is 
some sort of an evolutionary process within its own internal programming. 
Calo: Yeah. 
Speaker 5: It’s learning and interactive for the consumer and then 
putting on to the consumer the cost of effectively going into some aspect 
of that code, they should bring it to litigation and proving that, you know, 
this, this is the origin of, you know, the flaws. I’m just wondering within 
the context of your research if you’ve come across the, or, just based on 
like a more intelligent way of phrasing that issue, and how people are 
approaching it? 
Calo: I mean, I thought it was very well phrased by you just now. I 
mean, so what, what, one of the things that motivated the project that I 
mentioned about the federal robotics commission that I did for Brookings 
was the story about the Toyota sudden acceleration. Do you guys 
remember this? So, so, people were claiming that Toyota was like 
suddenly accelerating and nobody really knew why and at one point the 
allegation was put forward that it was a software glitch, right? So, 
Congress went to the Department of Transportation and said, “We need to 
figure this out because there’s millions of these and Americans are driving 
around in them and we need to figure out whether it was a software glitch 
that caused this sudden acceleration.” And Department of Transportation 
was like, “I mean Hell if we know,” right? And they’re like, “No, you’ve 
got to figure this out.” And they’re like, “Okay.” And then they had to go 
to NASA. They had to go to NASA and, and can you imagine that for a 
moment? Like, by the way, it’s like excuse me, yes, could you take a break 
from putting robots on Mars for a moment and look at this Toyota for us? 
You know what I mean? And they did. They did months and months and 
months. So, they looked at the code and they did all this testing and, yeah, 
they found out that probably it wasn’t a software glitch, right? 
So, part of the reason to have a centralized set of affordances around, 
around, you know, robotic technology and artificial intelligence is because 
asking NASA all the time is not a sustainable model. Okay? 
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So, so, that said you asked a question specifically about litigation. I 
mean, a couple ways to answer that. One is just to say that, you know, 
contemporary litigation is complicated. People fight over complicated 
technologies. We bring in experts. We can do it, right? We have 
specialized courts for patents, I mean, it’s not beyond our ability. A second 
thing to say is that the, the context in which robotics has already flourished 
it’s interesting to note that those are special contexts that have ways to 
domesticate liability built into them. So, for example, every year a couple 
people get killed by a robot in a factory. You know what I mean? Like 
that’s just every year. OSHA statistics are pretty reliable about this and it’s 
almost always handled by Workers Compensation because we have a 
whole system that like is kind of bloodless, but it sort of, you know, says 
if you lost a leg you get this, if you die you get this. You know, the military 
is a place where robotics has flourished. There’s, you know, special 
protections for liability in the military context including for people who 
build robots for the military under contractor immunity. If you, if you build 
something very highly specified, specifications like the military does you, 
as the contractor, cannot be sued for things going wrong. Space is another 
one. 
So, you know, we, we do have to consider the idea that as robots 
enter the mainstream and are on, in the cars and in the skies and so forth 
that, that we’re going to have a lot more problems like this, but again, you 
know, maybe I’m just sort of Pollyannaish or naïve or whatever, but I feel 
like the law can, can handle it. You know, I think like all of you guys can 
handle it. 
Yeah? 
Speaker 6: So, you talked about it in the domestic context. I’m just 
wondering what’s happening globally and are we going to do this on our 
own as a country or is this something which should be a cross-coast of 
efforts? 
Calo: So, I enter into a lot of conversations particularly in the U.S., 
but also, you know, outside of the, outside the United States. World 
Economic Forum, U.N., things like that and, but in the United States one 
of the main ways that, that policymakers and, and others seem to think that 
this fits in is a matter of, of competition. You know, are the, are the 
Chinese or, or the dreaded Canadians going to, going to be the ones who, 
you know, and is this going to be like the first transformative technology 
since like steam that United States was not at the forefront of, right? And 
so, that’s the lens unfortunately by which we’re thinking about this and I 
think we shouldn’t be. I think instead we should be thinking about this 
from the perspective of, you know, these are global issues and they require 
global solutions. The one place where that is, the conversation is 
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happening is, of course, with, with respect to the Convention on 
Conventional Weapons and the, the mandate that, that weapons have 
meaningful human control. There’s a lot of consensus around that phrase 
I just said and a lot of robust discussion. Of course, devil being in the 
details. Precisely what does it mean to have, you know, meaningful human 
control? But there is a military conversation. But, unfortunately, the way 
we tend to frame it in the United States as we think about the global stage 
is are we going to win? You know? And that’s probably not, not terribly, 
not terribly productive. I wish I could respond better than that. Yeah. 
Okay, I think my time is up. The hook is here, but thank you 
everybody. I appreciate it. You’ll see me soon. 
 
